# X. WHITE PAPER ON IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS

- (U) On October 4, 2002, three days after the National Intelligence Council (NIC) published its classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on *Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) published an unclassified paper, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs*. The paper was drafted and ultimately released as a white paper on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, but the Intelligence Community (IC) intended the paper to also meet requests from Congress for an unclassified version of the classified NIE.
- (U) The unclassified paper was substantively similar to, although not nearly as detailed as, the classified NIE. The key judgments were almost identical in layout and substance in both papers. The key judgments of the unclassified paper were missing many of the caveats and some references to alternative agency views that were used in the classified NIE, however. Removing caveats such as "we judge" or "we assess" changed many sentences in the unclassified paper to statements of fact rather than assessments. For example, the classified NIE said,

We judge that all key aspects – research & development (R&D), production, and weaponization – of Iraq's offensive biological weapons (BW) program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War,

while the unclassified paper said,

All key aspects – research & development (R&D), production, and weaponization – of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.

(U) Because so many of these caveats were removed and because the unclassified paper was presented to the American public as the IC's case that Iraq had WMD programs, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) staff examined the IC's decision to produce an unclassified paper, the paper's evolution, and how it differed from the classified NIE, particularly why most of the caveats were removed from the paper's key judgments.

- (U) The IC started production of the white paper in May 2002, months before the classified NIE was requested by Members of the SSCI. On May 8, 2002, an assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) sent an electronic mail (e-mail) to the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Near East and South Asia (NESA) asking him to prepare a white paper on Iraq's WMD programs. The NIO told Committee staff that the DDCI had recently attended a meeting at the White House, and the DDCI wanted the paper as a follow-up to the meeting discussions. The Deputy Director for Central Intelligence testified at a March 4, 2004 Committee hearing that the paper was requested by the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee.<sup>35</sup>
- (U) The NIO tasked an Iraq military analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Office of Near East and South Asia (NESA) to prepare a draft. The NESA analyst completed an early draft by May 22, 2002, but because the DDCI did not provide a due date for the paper when it was originally tasked, the analyst and NIO staff worked intermittently on the draft for the next several months. During that time, the NIO said he and his staff came to the conclusion that the summary of the draft paper was somewhat weak, because it did not adequately summarize all of the important assessments on Iraq's WMD programs. The NIO told Committee staff that by the time he and his staff decided that the paper needed a "full-blown" key judgments section, the classified NIE was already underway. The NIO said that because his staff had not yet drafted an unclassified key judgments the National Intelligence Council (NIC) staff decided to declassify the NIE key judgments to use as the key judgments of the white paper and to make the paper the unclassified equivalent of the NIE. The NIC staff believed that this would also ensure that the two papers were as consistent as possible. The NIO told Committee staff that his deputy was charged with taking the classified NIE key judgments and, working with the staff of the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs who managed production of the classified NIE, extracting the judgments that could be used in the unclassified paper.
- (U) Committee staff asked the NIO why the caveats, such as "we judge" and "we assess" were removed from the key judgments when they were declassified for use in the unclassified paper. The NIO told Committee staff that he directed the NESA analyst and his deputy to avoid

The National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee serves as the sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. Members include the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and, as needed, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.

using "we" in the paper because he was unsure about whether the paper would be released as an IC product or a white paper without any specific agency or government entity identified as the author. The NIO thought that if the paper was released as a white paper and did not have a designated author other than the U.S. government, "we" would not be an appropriate term to use because "we" would not refer to anyone. The NIO read to Committee staff a note that he had written to the NESA analyst in May which said, "Nice draft. One non-substantive suggestion as you revise it is to avoid the first person as in 'we believe,' 'we have information,' etcetera, that we customarily use in intelligence pubs. I am getting clarification from the DDCI's office as to exactly what guise this will be coming out under, but it would probably be best to avoid any formulations that would leave it to be figured out exactly who the 'we' are." The NIO said that he recommended this change purely for stylistic reasons. He also said that he thought that because the whole section was titled "key judgments" that it was clear to the reader all of the contents were assessments.

- (U) The IC provided an unclassified white paper from February 1998 to the Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, which contained only one use of the word "we," but, the 1998 white paper contained other words which expressed the uncertainty behind the IC judgments without using the word "we." For example, the white paper referred to the world's experts saying "they believe" and "[the United Nations Special Commission] UNSCOM believes" and used phrases such as "the evidence strongly suggests" and "Iraq could," "Iraq has apparently," and "Iraq probably." Because the Committee's request to review other white papers has not been answered by the IC, the Committee cannot determine whether eliminating the use of the word "we" from such papers was standard IC practice.
- (U) The NIO for NESA also told Committee staff that some parts of the classified NIE were not included in the unclassified paper because they were outside of the scope of the tasking for the unclassified paper. The unclassified paper had been tasked in May 2002 at the request of the Deputies Committee and the classified NIE was tasked in September 2002 at the request of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Members. The papers' scopes were determined by those taskings. For example, the classified NIE had a section on Iraq's doctrine and WMD use in response to a specific question from Senator Carl Levin on the IC's assessment of the likelihood that Iraq would use WMD. The NIO said the unclassified paper was only supposed to address Iraq's possession of WMD, so he did not include a section on doctrine and use. The NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs told Committee staff that he considered including the section on use and doctrine when crafting the unclassified key judgments from the classified NIE's key judgments, but because the IC had low confidence in those judgments and thought their inclusion

would be "basically telling Saddam what we think he is thinking, and that just didn't seem smart at that point in the process, it was decided that we wouldn't do that."

## A. Differences Between the Classified NIE and Unclassified White Paper

#### 1. Nuclear Weapons

(U) There were only two notable differences between the classified NIE and unclassified white paper regarding Iraq's nuclear program. The first, was that the classified NIE included a reference to State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research alternative view on whether Iraq would have a nuclear weapon this decade, which was not included in the white paper. The second centered on the discussion of analysts' assessments of the aluminum tubes. The classified NIE said,

Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors — as well as Iraq's attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools — provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (The Department of Energy (DOE) agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program.)

The unclassified paper said,

Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.

(U) When the classified NIE referred to "most agencies" it was referring to the analytic agencies, CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the collection agencies, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)<sup>36</sup>. Although NSA and NIMA did agree with the analysis that the aluminum tubes were intended for Iraq's nuclear program, the agencies do not conduct all source analysis. The all-source analysis agencies were evenly split on the issue of the aluminum tubes; the CIA and DIA assessed the tubes were intended for a nuclear program and the DOE and State Department's Bureau of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> NIMA has recently been renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

Intelligence and Research (INR) assessed they were probably not. The all-source agencies were split three to one on the issue of nuclear reconstitution – the CIA, DIA and DOE assessed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, while INR assessed that Iraq's activities did not add up to a compelling case that Iraq was currently pursuing an "integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons." The unclassified paper did not include the explanation that the DOE, the IC's nuclear experts, specifically disagreed with the assessment that the aluminum tubes were intended for Iraq's nuclear program.

(U) The Vice Chairman of the NIC and the NIOs who drafted the classified NIE told Committee staff that the statement in the unclassified white paper – "most intelligence specialists assess" the tubes are intended for a nuclear program – was used because the NIC does not refer to disagreements between intelligence agencies in unclassified documents out of concern that the country being discussed would be tipped off to a potential cover story. For example, by publishing in an unclassified paper that a U.S. intelligence agency believed the tubes were intended for a rocket program, Iraq could learn that such a use was believable and could plausibly argue to the international community that the tubes were intended for rockets, even if they were really intended for a nuclear program.

### 2. Biological Weapons

- (U) The main differences between the biological sections of the classified NIE and the unclassified white paper centered on the removal of the words "we judge" from two of the assessments included in the key judgments of both papers. The classified NIE contained the following two assessments:
- We judge that all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.
- We judge that Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.

In the unclassified paper the words "we judge" were removed from both sentences which changed the assessments to statements of fact.

(U) In addition, following the statement that "Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives" the unclassified white paper included the phrase "potentially against the U.S. Homeland." This phrase had not been included in the BW key judgments of the classified NIE. Text referencing Iraq's potential to use biological weapons against the U.S. was included in a section of the key judgments regarding when Iraq would use WMD, but the text stated that Iraq would attempt such attacks "if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge" and said that such attacks would probably be carried out by special forces or intelligence operatives.

#### 3. Chemical Weapons

(U) The chemical sections of the classified NIE and the unclassified white paper differed in two respects. Again, the caveats or explanations of the IC's uncertainty regarding the WMD programs were removed for the unclassified version. First, the words "we assess" were removed from the sentence in the classified NIE,

We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX....

The unclassified white paper said,

Baghdad had begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.

(U) Second, the words "we have little specific information on Iraq's Chemical weapons (CW) stockpile" were removed from the classified NIE sentence,

Although we have little specific information on Iraq's chemical weapons stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents – much of it added in the last year.

The unclassified white paper said,

Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents.

(U) In both cases, eliminating these words from the chemical section of the unclassified paper portrayed the IC as far more certain of Iraq's chemical weapons program and chemical stocks than it actually was.

#### 4. Delivery Systems

(U) The classified and unclassified versions of the delivery sections of the NIE differed only in the assessment regarding unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The classified NIE assessed that Iraq was developing a UAV "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents, but included a footnote which noted,

The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs *primarily* intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability.

The unclassified paper eliminated the footnote and changed the assessment to say,

Iraq maintains . . . several development programs, including for a UAV most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.


(U) In eliminating the U.S. Air Force (USAF) footnote, the unclassified paper is missing an alternative explanation for the mission of the UAV and is missing the fact that USAF intelligence, the IC agency with primary responsibility for technical analysis on UAV programs, did not agree with the assessment that the UAVs were probably intended for unconventional weapons delivery, as asserted in the key judgments of the classified NIE.

# B. Primary Differences in the Key Judgments of the Classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Unclassified White Paper


Classified NIE	White Paper
We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of United Nations (UN) resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these key judgments.)	Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions.  Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.
We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts.	Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts.
In the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.	Most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
Most analysts believe that Saddam's personal interest in and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assess that the tubes probably are not part of the program.)	Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.
We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX.	Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.
Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents – much of it added in the last year.	Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agent.
We judge that all key aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization – of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.	All key aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization – of Iraq''s offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.
We judge that Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.	Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the U.S. Homeland.
Iraq maintains a small missile force and several developmental programs, including for a UAV probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents.	Iraq maintains a small missile force and several developmental programs, including for a UAV that most analysts assess probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.


# C. White Paper Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 85. The Intelligence Community's elimination of the caveats from the unclassified White Paper misrepresented their judgments to the public which did not have access to the classified National Intelligence Estimate containing the more carefully worded assessments.



(U) Conclusion 86. The names of agencies which had dissenting opinions in the classified National Intelligence Estimate were not included in the unclassified white paper and in the case of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the dissenting opinion was excluded completely. In both cases in which there were dissenting opinions, the dissenting agencies were widely regarded as the primary subject matter experts on the issues in question. Excluding the names of the agencies provided readers with an incomplete picture of the nature and extent of the debate within the Intelligence Community regarding these issues.





(U) Conclusion 87. The key judgment in the unclassified October 2002 White Paper on Iraq's potential to deliver biological agents conveyed a level of threat to the United States homeland inconsistent with the classified National Intelligence Estimate.

